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Puzzled about why and how coca-growing areas in Bolivia do not have the same levels of 
 violence and criminality experienced in their communities, eight peasant leaders from various 
­coca-growing­areas­of­Colombia­joined­a­study­tour­to­investigate.­Notwithstanding­­differences­
in­ histories­ of­ conflict,­ political­ economy,­ infrastructure,­ and­ state-society­ relations,­ two­
 explanations stood out. First, the usually overlooked intermediation role of strong local, self-
help, and typically non-state institutions in peasant communities that enables marginalised 
households to assert their interests in interactions with both state and market structures 
appear as a key factor in mitigating violence and criminal activity. Second, land tenure secu-
rity, access to public services, and diversifying local economies that draw land and labour away 
from illicit coca production could address the factors that draw in poor subsistence farmers, 
 including unemployed and under-employed rural workers, to the illicit trade. This paper presents 
a  documentation of the study tour, elaborates on the thinking behind the two explanations, and 
flags­signposts­for­possible­use­in­improving­public­policy­on­drugs­and­development.1
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Introduction
Contrary to common understanding, not all locations where the coca bush is grown – even where  contentious 
politics abound – are hotbeds of violence and criminality. The best example perhaps are the coca-growing 
areas of Bolivia, where no armed insurgencies or drug cartels are found, unlike in similar areas of Colombia. 
This has puzzled land-poor, displaced, and seasonally migrating Colombian peasants increasingly reliant on 
coca cultivation for survival while being exposed to the violence and criminality typically associated with 
the crop. Hence, they have asked: what mitigates violence and criminality in coca-producing areas?2 As the 
 government tries to implement the comprehensive peace agreement negotiated with the FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), they further ask: what is 
the future of coca-growing and coca-growers in a ‘post-conflict’ Colombia?3
In response, Christian Aid with the support of the Open Society Foundations organised in 2017 a 
study tour of eight Colombian peasant leaders to the coca-growing regions of Bolivia to find answers for 
 1 This paper was originally intended only as an internal learning document for the development agency Christian Aid, but then 
revised and submitted to the April 2018 Illicit Economies Colloquium (www.illicit2018.org). The views and analyses here are from 
the authors alone and not necessarily reflective of Christian Aid’s views. Thomas Mortensen is the Country Manager of Christian 
Aid in Colombia. Eric Gutierrez is the Senior Adviser on Tackling Violence and Building Peace, based in London and Dublin.
 2 Political reactions from Colombian peasants displaced by conflict are much more complex and varied than often assumed. Some 
have been displaced by corporate interests, others by the state, and still some more by other poor communities like themselves 
struggling for survival. For more, see Borras and Franco (2013).
 3 Since the 1980s Christian Aid has supported local partner organisations and households displaced by conflict in Colombia to claim 
their rights to land and territory, to hold state institutions accountable and actively protect human rights, and to fight impunity. 
See more on https://www.christianaid.org.uk/about-us/where-we-work/colombia. Since the 2016 signing of the peace agreement 
with FARC, these partners have also stepped up to get their voices heard, by making submissions and participating in processes for 
a longer-term political settlement. More challenges are now likely with the election of new president Ivan Duque, who has publicly 
expressed opposition to the peace agreement. 
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 themselves. The participants represented ANZORC (Asociacion Nacional de Zonas de Reserva Campesina 
or National Association of Peasant Reserve Zones), composed of peasant communities claiming access to 
land, and COCCAM (Coordinadora Nacional de Cultivadores de Coca, Amapola y Marihuana or National 
Coordination for Cultivators of Coca, Amapola, and Marijuana), a coordinating mechanism organised to give 
voice to  cultivators of crops considered illicit and to promote more effective and humane public  policies. 
Logistical support in Bolivia was provided by the Andean Information Network (AIN), which has also 
 published its own version of the outcomes. The OCCDI (Observatorio de Cultivos y Cultivadores Declarados 
Ilicitos, or Observatory of Crops and Producers Declared Illicit) provided invaluable advice and connections. 
Christian Aid’s Colombia Country Manager, Thomas Mortensen, joined the study tour.
The study tour’s participants are not detached observers with bystander anxieties. ANZORC’s  membership 
are peasant communities, many of which were forced to abandon their land to avoid violence and  conflict. 
The association was established in 2011 to provide organisational representation and support for  communities 
that want to establish Peasant Reserve Zones managed by small-scale farmers. Peasant Reserve Zones are a 
means to serve the interests of those being left behind and displaced by the rapid  commercialisation of 
Colombia’s agriculture and its decades-old conflicts while at the same time protecting the forests and the 
environment. ANZORC aims to tackle Colombia’s persistent agrarian crisis, fight the concentration of land 
under the control of large estates and multinational firms, and to look for real alternatives to illicit crop 
cultivation. Dozens of ANZORC and COCCAM representatives have been killed, jailed, and threatened with 
physical harm for their activism. As such, they are immersed in the messy politics of agrarian change, human 
rights enforcement, and alternative crop policies, and are well aware of the whole array of wider factors, 
including the cross-border roles of capital, that explain differing levels of violence, criminality, and state-
society relations not just between countries like Colombia and Bolivia but within Colombia itself. To most 
of them, the still little-understood experiences in Bolivia offered hope, lessons, and pointers on how they 
can better reconstruct their lives, and the study tour was welcomed as an opportunity to examine what can 
be done differently. They went to Bolivia to find out not only what they may be missing in their advocacies 
and everyday struggles and to consolidate or affirm what else can be done with the challenges they face. 
They also sought to establish links with the cocaleros of Bolivia that they have heard much about.4
After the study tour, the participants held workshops with their grassroots memberships in the Colombian 
provinces of Antioquia, Nariño, Caqueta, and Guaviare, from which two key explanations stood out:
•	 The presence of strong, local, self-help, and typically non-state institutions in peasant 
 communities – that give voice to marginalised households and allow them to assert their interests 
in interactions with both markets and state institutions – is likely a key among various factors that 
mitigate violence and criminal activity in coca-growing areas.
•	 The future of coca-growing areas may be better secured not by traditional crop substitution 
 programmes alone, but by drawing land and labour away from illicit economies. Instead of 
 narrowly focusing on the replacement of crops, it is necessary to ensure instead improved land 
tenure security to peasants displaced by conflict, who can then invest in more sustainable 
 agriculture; to offer secure and longer-term income and employment opportunities; and most 
importantly, to provide access to public services to the pools of under- and unemployed young 
people, including seasonally-migrating agricultural workers dispersed across Colombia.
This paper provides a contribution to the wider literature on the relationships between violence, drugs, 
the state, and development. Though violence, whether in Colombia or Bolivia, is a complex and messy 
 phenomenon that emerge in various manifestations and with many different structural and short-term 
drivers rooted in local contexts, various forms of agency can be mobilised in such contexts to tackle the 
violence.5 Furthermore, as study tour participants found out in their interaction with Bolivian cocaleros, 
 4 ANZORC and COCCAM leaders are seeking to understand how war and conflict transform and shape socio-economic relationships 
and the distinctive political economies in their communities. In many ways, this is a rejection of, or at least scepticism about, the 
‘temptation of the technical’ – or “the belief that (development agencies) could help economically transform poor countries by 
providing timely doses of capital and technical knowledge while maintaining a comfortably clinical distance from these countries’ 
internal political life” (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013: 3–4).
 5 Note that our comparisons of violence are not based on quantitative measurements, such as incidents and intensity, but on the 
qualitative historical experience in Colombia and Bolivia. As Gutierrez et al. explained (August 2010), comparisons based on quan-
titative measurements often fail to reveal nuances in social contexts and are extreme simplifications of reality for purposes of 
isolation and data manipulation. What we examine in this paper is the wider and larger stories.
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political mobilisation rather than market and public services reforms may play a more decisive role in the 
construction of choices to move out of the illicit economy.
This contribution – which presents a documentation of the study tour and elaborates on the thinking 
behind the two explanations – is an attempt to draw attention to the ways that development agencies may 
be able to support ways of mitigating violence in such contexts, in transforming local economies, and in 
enabling more sustainable peacebuilding.
A Historical Context of Contentious Coca Policies
The study tour’s key conclusion is that it is possible to develop public policies that simultaneously remove 
 criminal control of the commerce in coca leaves while reducing violent clashes between producers and law 
enforcers, through constructive engagement with all stakeholders. The underlying statement is that coca is 
not cocaine, i.e. coca growing is not the same as cocaine trafficking; its growers, therefore, are not necessarily 
 criminals.6 The Colombian peasant leaders have been consistent in their restatement – that the public policy 
problem is not simply about tackling drug traffickers and cocaine producers, but instead should be about draw-
ing more attention to rural marginalisation and addressing the conditions that draw survivors to the illicit trade.
Crafting such policies is difficult because of the intensely contentious politics over coca, where taking 
sides poses risks. For example, civil society groups opposing state-enforced crop eradication because it 
destroys livelihoods and violates human rights have been accused of siding with criminals. Similarly, public 
officials do not want to be seen as deviating from the ‘official line’ of eradication, especially when military 
and development aid are at stake. These tensions spilled into the study tour, when public discord  heightened 
between ANZORC and the aid-funded National Agency for the Substitution of Illicit Crops. Colombian offi-
cials invited to observe the tour were initially open to the idea and subsequently decided not to take part.
ANZORC and COCCAM have long suggested that public policies around coca and other crops disregard 
the complexity of household decision making on whether to plant an illicit crop or not, or to abandon one 
crop in favour of another. Decisions are shaped not just by prices and opportunities, but by the daily realities 
of chronic land tenure insecurity; extreme indebtedness; or lack of access to credit, agricultural extension 
services, and insurance cover. Decisions will be different in locations where no paved road networks exist or 
are considered too dangerous and remote for state services and protection to reach. Protection, or the lack 
of it, impacts significantly on livelihoods and the control of assets like land, livestock, and transportation. 
Significant parts of Colombia are in reality controlled by non-state actors, and the level of killing of human 
rights defenders has become the highest in the world.7 Those killed include COCCAM members – a total of 
38 by the end of August 2018 – promoting voluntary crop substitution. As such, poor farmers in most cases 
take the choice of the lesser evil – for example when seasonal migrant workers choose to work under slave 
conditions in the processing of coca to cocaine.
While Bolivia has not suffered from internal conflict and such high levels of drug-related violence, it has 
had its share of violent clashes between coca growers and state security forces. In the peasant  mobilisations 
of 1988 prior to the enactment of Law 1008 on coca eradication, confrontations with the rural drug police 
known as the ‘Leopards’ left dozens dead, including in the infamous ‘Villa Tunari massacre’ of June 1988 
(Leons & Sanabria 1997: 29). The coca growers responded by further organising sindicatos or coca  workers’ 
unions to respond to the violence and better protect their livelihoods. Soon, the identity of ‘cocalero’ 
emerged. The sindicatos then reached out to allies as similarly affected campesinos (peasants) and indig-
enous people. They sought to legitimise their struggles to external audiences by raising issues wider than 
the coca (Durand-Ochoa 2012: 196).
It was in this context that the Bolivian slogan ‘yes to coca, no to cocaine’ emerged, calling on coca cultiva-
tion to be protected, while trying to prevent the coca from feeding into criminal markets to be transformed 
into cocaine. But this policy is most thoroughly misunderstood especially at the international stage, where 
coca-growing is mostly regarded as a criminal activity itself, and its growers automatically stigmatised as 
criminals. As such, in June 1998, when the cocaleros applied to speak at the first UN General Assembly 
Special Session on the World Drug Problem to argue their case, they were denied visas to enter New York.
Realising, perhaps, that the only way to get their voices heard and be taken seriously is by demonstrating 
political strength, the cocaleros augmented their social movement building with the establishment of ‘polit-
ical instruments’ – i.e. parties or organisations that directly entered the electoral arena. And in December 
 6 Some authors have suggested that the inclusion of coca in the list of banned products under the UN’s 1961 Single Convention is a 
‘historical mistake’. See Henmaan and Metaal (2009).
 7 See https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/resource-publication/annual-report-human-rights-defenders-risk-2017.
Mortensen and Gutierrez: Mitigating Crime and Violence in Coca-growing Areas66
2005, they scored a dramatic and major victory. One of the cocalero representatives denied a visa – Evo 
Morales – was elected President with the widest margin ever in Bolivia’s election history (Forero, 2005).
With the cocalero’s effective capture of formal state power, Bolivia then proceeded to reverse the  simplifying 
fictions and historical mistakes of international drug control policy that had become tools for the cocaleros’ 
repression. The central change came in 2009 when Bolivia adopted a new constitution which stated:
The State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource 
of Bolivia’s biodiversity, and as a factor of social unity. In its natural state coca is not a narcotic. 
It’s revaluing, production, commercialization and industrialization shall be regulated by law 
(Article 384, Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia).8
The election victory of Morales signifies many things. It showed the transition of marginalised cocaleros 
stigmatised as criminal actors and peddlers of a ‘social poison’ to a resilient social movement and then to 
the core of a political coalition that captured formal power via elections. They can now engage the United 
Nations with their own voice as legal and legitimate players. Most importantly from a legal perspective, the 
coca plant has been officially recognised as legal and legitimate. In short, Bolivian cocaleros ‘transformed 
themselves from producers of a good of questionable legitimacy to defenders of Bolivia’s sovereignty, indig-
enous cultures, and the historically excluded’, who turned the source of illegitimacy – the coca leaf – into 
a potent national symbol versus the economic elites, traditional political parties, and the United States 
(Durand-Ochoa 2012: 180–196).
General Findings of the Study Tour
The Colombians in the study tour confirmed the relative success of the Bolivian model. Overall, they came 
away with the impression that removing criminal control of coca-growing, improving livelihoods, and at the 
same time reducing human rights abuses by state forces is clearly possible.
The Colombians were impressed that relationships between Bolivian farmers and state authorities have 
been deeply transformed – something that is difficult for a Colombian farmer to even imagine. The  delegation 
had accompanied a team of the Bolivian armed forces on an eradication exercise. Unlike the  arbitrary and 
typically repressive enforcement of state authority that Colombians often experience, it was the Bolivian 
sindicatos themselves that identified the locations of excessive coca production, showing that to a  certain 
extent, farmers have some form of control over the operations of the armed forces. Some pointed out 
that the Army colonel in charge of the exercise was friendly not just to the visitors but to the Bolivian 
 farmers too – sharing a meal together and riding in the same vehicle as they did – something that would be 
extremely rare in Colombia.
But most significant was how the eradication operation took place without violence.9 Indeed, the 
Colombians recognise that problems exist by the mere fact that an eradication exercise still needed to be 
conducted, as they sympathized with the farmer whose crops were destroyed. However, the overriding 
 concern of the sindicatos is to preserve coca-growing as a livelihood, and in order to do this, they would 
have to control production from feeding into the criminal market by identifying where over-production 
takes place. The decision is not without resistance but is overall deemed fair and well-managed, as shown by 
the relative absence of open rejection of the authority of the sindicatos.
Moreover, meeting the sindicatos and learning about how cocaleros are organised made it clear that the 
existence of strong and legitimate farmers’ organisations is a prerequisite for controlling the  production 
of coca leaves. The sindicatos were not only effective institutions representing the collective interests of 
 cocaleros in negotiations with state and market actors; they also enforced agreements. Governmental 
authorities cannot by themselves deal with thousands of individual farmers on the ground. This was seen as 
a clear structural difference from the Colombian experience.
Hearing the Colombians’ experiences of repression, the Bolivian hosts were keen to emphasize that before 
2005, eradication operations in Bolivia were typically violent too. ‘That is how it used to be,’ one of them 
 8 The translation into English of Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution has been published by the Oxford University Press and is available at 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf. 
 9 This validates the observation of Grisaffi and Ledebur (2016) that the launch of the cato policy (discussed in a later paragraph) led 
to sharp reductions in protests and violence almost immediately. See https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.440/. 
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said, ‘before the change in public policies and the introduction of the cato’ – the system that allowed a 
 farming household to legally grow a limited and regulated quantity of coca leaves in a cato (approximately 
one-third the size of a football field). The sindicatos then regulated production, effectively establishing social 
control, which moves coca away from typical markets that tend to be dominated by criminal  interests over 
time. The system is not without faults, but the Bolivians confirm that it has decreased violence, increased 
citizen engagement, and limited corruption.10
Most importantly, the Bolivians affirm that the policy stabilised and diversified local economies, leading to 
a gradual but nonetheless marked reduction in coca cultivation over time. Coca cultivation, they said, peaked 
at 31,000 hectares in 2010, but has since gone down to 20,000–22,000 hectares, although critics attribute 
this reduction to more intensive and improved farming methods. Still, the Bolivian cocaleros believe that with 
more consistent evaluation, the system could be improved and better adapted to different local contexts.
The Colombians took notice of the higher profile of women in Bolivia, especially at the local level. 
Bolivia is known for its high electoral quotas for women, where political parties are now required to have 
at least 50% of their lists of candidates to be women. As a result, 69 out of 130 members (53%) in the 
Chamber of Deputies are women, while women occupy 47% of all positions in municipal councils across 
the  country after the 2015 elections.11 Within the sindicatos, though admittedly still dominated by men, 
women  nevertheless have a bigger voice, aided by strong women campesino federations like the Bartolina 
Sisa confederation, named after an Aymara woman who led an uprising against Spain in 1781.
This does not mean, however, that there is already gender parity in Bolivia. Many problems remain, 
 including women in elective posts and women anti-corruption campaigners being bullied by men whose 
power has now become threatened.12 Nevertheless, to the Colombians, there is much to learn from  women’s 
empowerment in Bolivia. Although the study tour did not have a particular women’s focus when it started, 
it became apparent to the visitors that this may be one of the important structural factors explaining 
 differences in the Bolivian experience.
Despite their favourable impressions of the Bolivian approach, the Colombians were very much aware that 
tensions continue over coca policy. In fact, during their visit, they saw an anti-government demonstration 
in La Paz by coca growers from the Yungas region, whose coca leaves are perceived to have better quality. 
The legal market is said to be at 15,000 hectares, but due to pressure from growers has been increased to 
20,000 hectares. With the Yungas protests, a further increase to 22,000 hectares was allowed. This creates, 
say  critics, an oversupply that will feed into the criminal market. The fraught negotiations over national 
limits and reports of coca plantations within national parks13 confirm that there just is no ‘silver bullet’ to 
overcome the problem of coca production for drug trafficking. The important point, however, is that this 
model, despite its imperfections, appears critical in preventing violence.
The visitors expressed the opinion that it is important not to undermine this model, while seeking ways 
to tackle its imperfections. Colombia faces a tougher challenge as its area planted to coca is about 8 times 
larger than Bolivia. The most recent estimates by UNODC put Colombia’s coca area at 171,000 hectares in 
2017. Hence, it is regarded as the principal source of the world’s cocaine supply.
To be clear, the Bolivian cato policy could not be expected to automatically produce targeted outcomes 
in what is after all a very contentious and complex issue in an essentially unpredictable context. When it 
was introduced, the policy did not immediately cause a reduction in the overall production, which peaked 
at 31,000 hectares before gradually decreasing alongside negotiations and review with Yungas producers. 
This demonstrates the importance of open and transparent negotiations, paying attention to political  factors 
and ensuring that all voices are heard, and adapting the approach to local circumstances. It also shows that 
policy makers need to not only be pragmatic as there are no perfect solutions, but also open to learning and 
adapting policies to local contexts.
The Colombian visitors were also introduced to the agro-industrial potential of coca leaves. Since the ‘golden 
years’ of drug trafficking in Bolivia in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been talk of creating an  indigenous 
state-supported agro-industry that would produce, process, and export products from coca leaves – i.e. coca 
 10 An extended discussion on social control in Bolivia comes from Ledebur and Youngers (2013).
 11 Source: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas.
 12 A longer discussion is presented in a separate Christian Aid report ‘Gender and Politics in Bolivia: Violent Repercussions for Women 
(2016)’, see https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/about-us/gender-and-politics-bolivia-violent-repercussions-political.
 13 http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/UNODC-coca-ilegal-areas_protegidas-Poligono-Bolivia_0_2988301162.html.
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tea, soap, shampoo, and skin lotions (Painter 1994: Chapter 1). Because of the criminalisation of the crop, 
no programmes have emerged. Thus, an agro-industry – whether in Bolivia or Colombia – will require a 
strong push, investments, and state leadership to reverse coca’s stigmatisation and its limited regional and 
international markets.
Needless to say, the visitors are well aware of problems in replicating the Bolivian model in Colombia. 
Firstly, the legality of the cato is closely linked to the fact that there is a big legal market for coca leaves in 
Bolivia, unlike in Colombia. Coca-chewing is a deeply ingrained tradition, especially in the Bolivian  highlands, 
whereas in Colombia the tradition only exists in some indigenous communities. Secondly,  agro-projects seem 
to be relatively successful in Chapare, not only because of strong infrastructure (better roads,  electricity, and 
access to public institutions), but also because of a lack of (unfair) competition from large-scale domestic 
and foreign agro-industries that capture land and public services at the expense of poor peasant households. 
As noted during the visit, Bolivia has no free-trade agreement with the US and European Union that allows 
the unrestricted entry of multinationals into the country. Thirdly, Colombia is a close US ally, while Bolivia 
openly defies US foreign and drug policy and cut relations in 2008.
UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) monitoring of coca production – from satellite photos, aerial 
observation, to field visits – has been criticised as expensive and excessive. Yet Bolivian cocaleros praise 
it for a positive technical role because it provides a very solid methodology for affirming  production 
 levels that can withstand US criticism and validate whether the Government of Bolivia is lying in its 
 figures. According to Bolivia-based campaigning group Andean Information Network, the UNODC effec-
tively  prevents the US State Department from manipulating data to suit US policy. As such, this technical 
role, which now informs the European Union’s programmes for coca-producing areas, may be indirectly 
 supporting the Bolivian model altogether.
Finally, the farmers from Colombia were impressed by the capacity of the system to triangulate data on 
each cato and the owner of the land. This again may be a critical difference – it may be possible only because 
there is a more stable and reliable land registration and property security in Bolivia. In Colombia’s remote 
peripheral rural areas where coca leaves tend to be grown, land registration is very weak.
Challenges for the Crop Substitution Policy
The study tour generated some important observations on the challenges ahead for a reformed crop 
 substitution policy in Colombia. For example, the participants point out promising results from  EU-supported 
crop substitution projects, such as performance-based budget support to Bolivia that, in general, enables 
wider and predictable access to essential public services by poor coca-growing households. In contrast, most 
of the US ‘help’ to Colombia appears to be singularly focused on law enforcement – i.e. to use crop substitu-
tion not as a means to reform the agrarian sector, but to enforce illicit crop eradication. US projects have also 
been criticised as providing business opportunities to American contractors.
The visitors are keen to explore replicating the Fondo Nacional de Desarollo Integral (FONADAL or the 
National Fund for Integrated Development) in Colombia. Fonadal is a specialised agency established by 
Bolivia’s Ministry for Land and Rural Development that, among others, provide funding and technical 
 support for the improvement of infrastructure that enable produce from agrarian communities to reach the 
markets. The Colombians were surprised to see that small farmers in Bolivia have actual access to roads and 
formal credit.
It was through such infrastructure projects that cost-benefit analyses were clarified. For example, a Fonadal 
official explained that from one cato (1600 square meters) of coca, a farmer can generate around 20,000 
Bolivianos (approx. USD 2900 or GBP 2046) per year in profit. In comparison, one hectare (10,000 sq. metres) 
of pineapple generates around 50,000 Bolivianos (approx. USD 7259 or GBP 5116) in profit. Thus, for every 
square metre, growing coca delivers a profit of 12.5 Bolivianos, while for pineapples, it is 5 Bolivianos. But 
not only is coca more profitable, it also takes far less effort due to the limited size of the cato and because 
coca-growing requires less maintenance. This may be the reason why limited coca-growing in catos, along 
with smallholder access to public infrastructure, is apparently enabling more agricultural  diversification in 
Bolivia’s coca-growing areas.
Fonadal-funded projects and support, most importantly, are provided without any precondition to reduce 
coca leaf production. A Colombian participant noted a key point that rather than prioritising other goals 
like security or law enforcement, what is necessary as demonstrated in Bolivia are ‘sound public policies 
on rural economic development’. The conclusions from the study tour, thus, provide clear inputs to the 
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peace  process on how the issue of illicit crops could be addressed by a combination of integrated rural 
 development reforms with voluntary crop substitution programmes.14
Still there is wide room for improvement. Fonadal’s provision of full subsidies to the poorest households 
seems to have generally led to dependence, not resilience. Fonadal now wants to make credit and subsidies 
smarter by reducing it to 70–90%, depending on overall poverty conditions locally. Fonadal also recognises 
a further challenge – targeting is essential since the poorest tend to be crowded out of access to credit and 
subsidies by the better-educated and better-connected, especially when more conditions are applied.
Study tour participants met several trainers and agricultural extension experts during the visit, one of 
whom told the Colombians that he believes Bolivian cocaleros have shown a greater willingness to reduce 
coca production because of loyalty to Evo Morales. In other words, political mobilisation, rather than market 
and public services reforms, may play a more decisive role in the construction of choices to move out of the 
illicit economy. And there will also remain problems of political unity, such as the Yungas-Chapare divide. 
While projects in the mountainous Yungas have been generally less successful due to soil conditions, less 
land, and less infrastructure, compared to the flat, low-lying, and infrastructure-equipped Chapare, many 
Yungas farmers believe that the real reason is government bias for Chapare, which has benefitted from 
 massive public investments on infrastructure projects. Evo Morales is from Chapare and is still the president 
of the Coca Growers Federation in Cochabamba and he also the candidate for the federation’s upcoming 
elections in 2019.15 Another point fuelling tensions between the two coca growing regions is that the coca 
leaves from Yungas is known to be better for chewing because they are smaller, finer, and sweeter, which 
brings up the question of what happens to the surplus of leaves from the Chapare region.
Conclusion
While various lessons and conclusions can be drawn from the study tour, this paper limits its main  deductions 
to the roles taken by three key actors in the story – local peasant organisations, state institutions, and 
 external aid-providing agencies.
What is clear from the Bolivian experience, as observed by the Colombian peasant leaders, is that the 
 presence of strong, local, self-help, and typically non-state institutions in peasant communities is a key 
factor that mitigates violence and criminal activity in coca-growing areas. The Bolivian sindicatos used to 
be criminalised and stigmatised actors that were denied their voice in policy making. Yet they were strong 
enough to partly weather the stigmatisation, construct wider identities, and then use or create political 
opportunities that eventually translated into real political strength.
However, it was not only their capture of political power in Bolivia that is historically significant. Also impor-
tant were their efforts at reaching out to other marginalised actors, consolidating a social movement of the 
poor, making use of and creating their own political opportunities, and constructing a strategic development 
path that reclaimed legitimacy at the local, national, and international stages. The cato system enforced since 
2005 took years to develop and still has many imperfections but is continually evolving. The cocaleros were 
not just a social movement; they became a sophisticated political force that claimed power and legitimacy 
and turned an outlawed commodity into ‘a potent national symbol that signified opposition to the economic 
elites, the traditional political parties, and the United States’ (Durand-Ochoa 2012).
There are of course stark differences in context between Bolivia and Colombia. But the bottom line is that 
political mobilisation appears as a pre-requisite for the enforcement of public policies favourable to the 
poor and marginalised, and which enables them to construct independence, autonomy, and the leverage 
necessary for successful negotiations with market players, both licit and illicit, as well as with state institu-
tions. The possibilities of how the Colombian peasant leaders will transform their strategy and practice of 
political mobilisation at home, especially in the context of the peace process and given the new president’s 
rightward turn combined with the strong pressure from the US, is something to watch.16
 14 It should be noted that rural reforms face strong resistance in the Colombian Congress; the Government also tends to enforce 
crop substitution rather than making it voluntary. There may also be implications now that a politician who has expressed strong 
reservations with the peace agreement has been elected Colombian president.
 15 http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Cocaleros-ratifica-dirigente-Morales-binomio-Evo-Alvaro-2019_0_2972702736.html.
 16 Colombia has had a long and varied history of political mobilisations, including the September 1996 ‘Cocalero Uprising’ in its 
southern provinces, that as Ramirez explained, demonstrated how the identity of campesino-cocalero was politicised and shaped 
by the sense of exclusion and abandonment of poor peasants by the central state. See Ramirez (2011).
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The ascendance of cocaleros to power in Bolivia deeply transformed relationships between poor peasant 
communities and state institutions, including the military. Though much of it remains contentious and fraught 
with problems, the role of the state appears to have changed from primarily being a law enforcer imposing its 
will on typically activist local groups to a platform for developing solutions to the problems in the first place. 
The cato system, despite its imperfections, appears to be working overall. State  instruments, like Fonadal, are 
focused on real rural development. Land and property, comparatively speaking, have become more secure.
There seems to be a greater willingness to reduce overall coca production not just because of political 
loyalties to those in power, but more importantly because there has been a clear movement away from the 
chronic lack of income opportunities, poor infrastructure, inadequate or costly access to markets – that the 
criminal and the corrupt tend to exploit to their advantage over time, something which Colombian coca 
producers are well aware of. The challenges in Colombia appear far greater, not just because its coca areas 
are eight times larger than in Bolivia, but also because of the more intense repression of marginalised coca 
growers and the country’s history of powerful and globalised drug cartels. But what has become clear in 
Bolivia is that conditions for stabilising and diversifying local economies are slowly being put in place. In 
other words, the state is playing a leading role in drawing land and labour away from the illicit economy and 
in moving away from the rather limited ambition of law enforcement–focused crop substitution.
The study tour also provides lessons for external actors wishing to support agrarian change, not just in 
Bolivia and Colombia, but elsewhere. Using crop eradication as a pre-condition for official development 
aid is clearly counter-productive. The risks to local and state actors posed by being perceived as pro-coca, 
and therefore ‘pro-criminal’, need to be eliminated. There is useful practice on the ground, such as the 
 experience in EU-supported projects, as well as the technical role of the UNODC in Bolivia.
In conclusion, various of forms of agency and political mobilisation are possible in Colombia. Along with 
policy innovations to draw land and labour away from the illicit economy and the continued building of 
links to facilitate learning across different local contexts, these can go a long way in addressing the different 
drivers of violence that development agencies and policy-makers could consider to support.
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